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Merge pull request #193 from rkta/asn1_string_manipulation

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Fix manipulation of ASN1_STRING
This commit is contained in:
Tatsuya Kinoshita
2021-09-18 20:52:37 +09:00
committed by GitHub
parent 456ec66be8 cab914ef48
commit b8a443130c
1 changed files with 19 additions and 8 deletions
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27
istream.c
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@@ -422,25 +422,36 @@ ssl_check_cert_ident(X509 * x, char *hostname)
gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(alt, i);
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
char *sn = ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
unsigned char *sn = ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
#else
char *sn = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5);
const unsigned char *sn = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5);
#endif
int sl = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
/*
* sn is a pointer to internal data and not guaranteed to
* be null terminated. Ensure we have a null terminated
* string that we can modify.
*/
char *asn = GC_MALLOC(sl + 1);
if (!asn)
exit(1);
bcopy(sn, asn, sl);
asn[sl] = '\0';
if (!seen_dnsname)
seen_dnsname = Strnew();
/* replace \0 to make full string visible to user */
if (sl != strlen(sn)) {
if (sl != strlen(asn)) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sl; ++i) {
if (!sn[i])
sn[i] = '!';
if (!asn[i])
asn[i] = '!';
}
}
Strcat_m_charp(seen_dnsname, sn, " ", NULL);
if (sl == strlen(sn) /* catch \0 in SAN */
&& ssl_match_cert_ident(sn, sl, hostname))
Strcat_m_charp(seen_dnsname, asn, " ", NULL);
if (sl == strlen(asn) /* catch \0 in SAN */
&& ssl_match_cert_ident(asn, sl, hostname))
break;
}
}